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    CHAPTER II. THE MORAL SYSTEM

    Having sufficiently shown that there is a distinction between moral and natural law, and that all men recognize it and act upon the fact, even if they do not admit it in theory, we have a question of great importance to propose. None but the reckless and unthinking can pass it by without giving it attention. The candid must admit that it is one of great interest. It is this: Will these aspirations for the right, this innate sense of justice, to which we have referred, ever be gratified? That they are not, that they cannot be gratified in the present state, scarcely needs further notice. Is my moral nature, my sense of right and justice, satisfied to see virtue trodden under foot? to see the libertine mocking over the grave of blighted hopes and a broken heart? to see the priceless treasure of virtuous purity, around which cluster the fondest hopes of earth, sported with as a mere toy of little worth? to see honest toil sink unrequited, and hide itself in squalid poverty and a pauper’s grave? to see the vain rolling in wealth accumulated by fraud and oppression? to see vice exalted to the pinnacle of fame? to hear the praises of him whose very presence is loathsome by reason of the filthiness of his iniquities? And when words fail to express the horrors of such and kindred evils, must I smile complacently and say, This is right? in this my soul delights? But this is but a mere glance at the facts as they exist, as they have existed, and are likely to exist in this present state. Is it possible that these aspirations, these discriminations of right and wrong, were placed within our breasts to be mocked—to look and long in vain? Is it possible that the Supreme One, who has so nicely arranged the material world, and subjected it to certain laws, has placed moral balances in our hands to no purpose? that we are to long for, but never see, a vindication of the great principles of justice? Is it not rather reasonable to conclude that he has a moral Government, and that our moral sense is evidence that we are within the limits of a moral system? Are not our convictions of wrong proof to ourselves of our amenability to such a system?AERS 21.1

    The very fact that we discriminate between moral and natural laws, as we have seen that all men do, and that all pronounce upon the right or wrong of the actions of mankind, is proof of the general recognition of the existence of a moral Government. And so to look above nature, to acknowledge God as a moral Governor, is necessary, to be true to our own natures, to the convictions planted in every breast. In this great truth our aspirations find rest. Here our sense of justice takes refuge; for a Government is a system of laws maintained, and the very idea of a moral Government leads us to look forward to a vindication of the right principles or laws now trampled upon. Why should we pronounce upon the merit or demerit of human actions, if there is no accountability for those actions? Our feelings of responsibility (the movings of conscience) are but the expectation of a great assize, in or by which injustice, fraud, and every wrong, will be requited, and down-trodden virtue and injured innocence be exalted and vindicated. This is, indeed, but a legitimate deduction from the propositions established, and in this we find a sure vindication of the divine Government in regard to the anomalies of the present state.AERS 22.1

    It must, however, be admitted that there are some who deny the existence of moral wrong, and, of course, of accountability for our actions. But their denial or our admission does not weaken our argument, for the denial is only in profession, not in practice. The denial is based on the alleged inability of man to act except in a given line. Man (say they) is a creature of circumstances; the motives which impel him to action are outside of his own will; he is led of necessity to do just as he does, and he cannot do otherwise. Therefore he is not responsible for his actions. But we affirm that this is only their professed belief; not their actual belief. For in practice we find them uniformly false to their theory. They will, as readily as others, sit in judgment upon, and condemn, the actions of their fellow-men. They will blame any for encroaching on their rights. But it were surely the height of folly, the grossest injustice, to blame one for doing that which he cannot avoid. And how unreasonable to think that God bestows a moral sense, and plants within us the monitor of conscience, to lead us to do right, and yet compels us to do wrong. We count the man immoral and degraded who disregards the distinctions of right and wrong; what contempt, then, is thrown upon the originator of the present system by the theory which admits that these distinctions exist; that of right they should be preserved, yet affirms that they cannot be preserved to any extent whatever. Admitting the existence of a God (and we now speak to the consciences of some), what shall we, what must we, think of a God who would frame a system wherein these distinctions could not be preserved? And yet such is the case, if man has no freedom to act. We all acknowledge the difference between right and wrong, as principles; that it is right to regard our neighbor’s life and property; and hence, he that disregards them does wrong. And all are conscious that the wrong we do is of ourselves; and no one ever seeks to throw it back to any other cause until his moral sense is perverted by selfishness and false reasoning.AERS 23.1

    Akin to the above position—at least in its unreasonableness—is the theory which admits the existence of God the moral Governor (though this admission is not essential to the theory), and admits that man is responsible for his actions, and admits that all violations of law are certainly punished, and yet denies a future judgment. This is intimately connected with, or is the out-growth of the error that there are penalties to natural laws; and that all penalties are inflicted immediately upon the violation. Thus (they say), if a man puts his hand in the fire he violates a law of his being; and he does not want to an indefinite future time for judgment and punishment; he suffers immediately and certainly; and for the violation there is no atonement or forgiveness. This, to some, appears to be truth, for they advance it; to us it seems like a puerility. We repeat, the suffering from contact with fire is not a judicial infliction to serve the ends of justice, as penalty is; it is but a consequence of the violation of natural law; and that it falls as certainly and as severely on the innocent as the guilty. The innocent and unconscious babe suffers by the fire as readily, as certainly, as the willful man. And we can go further in the illustration: the man in cruel malice may hold the hand of the child in the fire; the child does not offend against law, for it did not put its hand in the fire, and it vigorously tries to withdraw it. Here the man does all the wrong, and the child suffers all the penalty! Such is the wisdom, such the justice of this theory. The truth is, that the child suffers as a consequence of the man’s wrongdoing. He deserves punishment (the infliction of a penalty) for the action; and if justice is ever vindicated, he will be punished, according to his intention and his commission of a great moral wrong. The admission that all sin will be punished makes necessary the admission of a future judgment; for without that, justice will never be vindicated, and our aspirations for the right will never be satisfied.AERS 24.1

    But one more fallacy of this character we will notice. It is found in the oft-repeated idea that God is so loving, so kind, that he will not mark to condemn our aberrations from duty. It is not necessary to say that this is a denial of the Scriptures in regard to the character of God. But, laying the Bible aside, where is the evidence that God so loves his creatures that he will not mark their faults or maintain the justice of his government? Surely it is not learned from nature that love is the sole attribute of Deity. How came any by the idea that the Deity must possess that degree of love supposed in the statement? Whence do they derive their conceptions of such love, and of its necessity in the divine character? Can any tell?AERS 25.1

    They may reply that these conceptions are intuitive; that they are evolved from their own consciousness; that they have an innate knowledge of the moral fitness of things, and according to this, they clothe Deity with such attributes as their moral sense determines to be fitting to such a Being. Our reply to this is twofold. 1. We deny that such ideas are developed by intuition. The intelligent skeptics of this land and in this age do not derive their knowledge of right, and of the abundance of love in the character of Deity, from the light of nature. They derive this from their surroundings; from the prevalence of Christian influences and Christian literature. To show just what man can learn from nature and by mere intuition, we must take him entirely separated from the influence of the Bible and Christianity. And we hazard nothing in saying that, where Christian example and the teachings of the Bible were entirely unknown, man never developed an exalted idea of Deity. To the contrary, where men have trusted to the light of nature and to the power of human reason, their conceptions of Deity were low and base, generally vile; and this was the case even where there was considerable proficiency in philosophy and the arts. Many deny the Scriptures who are indebted to them and to their influence for very much of the knowledge of which they are proud. 2. In thus exalting love in the divine character at the expense of other attributes, they are only partially true to their higher nature; partially just to their own consciousness. Our consciousness, our self-judgment of the moral fitness of things, gives us as definite and clear conceptions of justice as of love. All the propositions established in this argument tend to this point. We are apt to lose sight of justice, and to exalt love. This is quite natural with all who have any sense of wrong (and who has not?), for we feel the need of love or mercy, and are ever willing or anxious to screen ourselves from justice. But in this, as before remarked, we do violence to our moral sense, to gratify our selfish feelings. Can any one dispassionately reason and reflect on this subject, and accept the idea of a God of even partial justice? The idea is alike repugnant to reason and to reverence. God must be strictly, infinitely just. Who would not choose to be annihilated rather than to possess immortal existence in a universe governed or controlled by a being of almighty power, but lacking justice?AERS 26.1

    Many professed believers in the Bible manifest the same tendency, to exalt the love of God above his justice. It is a great perversion of the gospel. God is infinite in every perfection. His love cannot be more than infinite. If his justice were less than infinite he would be an imperfect or finite being. The gospel plan was not devised, and Christ did not die, to exalt his love above his justice, but to make it possible to manifest his infinite love toward the penitent sinner, without disparagement to his infinite justice; “that he might be just, and the justifier of him who believeth in Jesus.” Romans 3:23-26. But this will be examined when we come to the Biblical argument.AERS 27.1

    Perhaps there never was a time when the idea expressed by Pope, “Whatever is, is right,” was so distorted and carried to an absurd extreme; as it is at the present. Some say that every action, whatever its nature, is acceptable to God, because it is performed under his overruling hand. One well-known “reformer” says that such a thing as “sin, in the common acceptation of the term, does not exist.” It is affirmed that sin cannot exist; that “there is no room in the universe for wrong to exist.” We heard a somewhat popular speaker declare that “what men call crimes are most valuable experiences in the march of human progress.” And these statements are not made by wild fanatics alone; they are argued in their most plausible forms by men, and women, also, who pass in their communities for staid and sober people. But on examination we find that the propagators of these theories get them up to relieve the mind of a sense of responsibility. This class of moral philosophers always frame their theories to throw the blame of wrong, if any wrong exists, upon God, the Creator, and never to leave it upon themselves!AERS 28.1

    We trust the reader will pardon the relation of “a true story” which contains an argument in itself worthy of consideration. Two men, machinists, working in a railroad shop, were conversing on this subject. One contended that if he did wrong he was not responsible for the wrong, for, said he, “I act out the disposition that was given me. If I make a locomotive and it will not work, you do not blame the locomotive, you blame me for my faulty workmanship. Even so, if I do not answer the end of my being, it is not my fault. The blame attaches to my Maker, who made me what I am.” His friend replied: “Your illustration is just and forcible, provided you insist that your Maker gave you no more brains than you put into a locomotive!”AERS 29.1

    The truth is that the possession of brains and will-power brings responsibility; and this responsibility necessarily attaches to creatures on our plane of being. If they who deny the existence of moral wrong would reflect a moment, they could not fail to perceive that their theory is really degrading to themselves. They are irresponsible if they are mere machines or unreasoning animals. But if they have the power to reason, to will, to choose, and have moral consciousness, a sense of right and wrong, responsibility must necessarily attend the use of these powers. And every one feels this responsibility; his conscience will not permit him to deny it, until he has seared his conscience, and blunted his moral sensibilities; that is to say, he has, in a greater or less degree, brutalized himself, and degraded his manhood, either by pernicious and false reasoning, or by an immoral life.AERS 29.2

    And now, looking over the whole field of argument on this subject, we ask: Is it not a humiliating thought that a word is necessary to prove to any one that moral wrong exists? Must I stop to reason with a man, a human being, with all his faculties in exercise, to prove to him that it is wrong to steal, to murder, or to commit adultery? To argue the subject, nay, to admit that it is a debatable question, is an insult to the sense of mankind. The real question at issue is, How shall we dispose of the evil which exists? or, How shall criminals be rescued from the awful consequences of their violations of the law of Him who is infinitely just? We do not ask the reader, or our doubting friend, to consider the question as to whether the guilty might not be suffered to escape by overruling or suspending justice, or how they might stand before a finite being, or a judge who is comparatively just. The real question is, How shall they stand before the judgment seat where justice is maintained and vindicated on the scale of infinity? where every evil thought and intention is counted as an overt act of iniquity and rebellion against a righteous Government? This, and nothing less, is involved in the very idea of a Supreme Being, an Infinite One who is a moral Governor, whose perfections demand that He shall take cognizance of every offense against His authority; every invasion of the rights of His subjects.AERS 30.1

    These are solemn questions, and demand our candid consideration. If God is infinitely just—and can he be otherwise?—if he will bring every work into judgment, and we shall have to meet our life records there, how shall we stand in His presence? It certainly becomes us to deal candidly with ourselves, and to understand, if possible, those principles of justice which must prevail in a wise and righteous government. Sin is everywhere, and in our own hearts. What shall be done in regard to it?AERS 31.1

    We may indeed flatter ourselves that our sins have not been very great; we may persuade ourselves to believe that, compared to those of others, our lives have been quite creditable. But we must remember that wrong never appears odious to the habitual wrong-doer; therefore no one is competent to judge in his own case. The decision will not be made upon our actions as they look to us, but as they look to the Infinite Lawgiver and Judge. We will not be compared with our neighbor, in the Judgment, but with the law which is holy, and just, and good. The spirituality of that law we cannot comprehend, even as we cannot fathom the mind of its Author. We must stand in the light of Heaven’s purity and glory.AERS 31.2

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