Plato’s Phaedrus, another late work, has a section bringing out further points on the alleged nature of the soul (245) ^{11) W. C. Helmbold and W. G. Rabinowitz, Plato’s Phaedrus, in LLA, No. 40, p. 27.} that bear directly on Innate Immortality. Part of this discussion parallels the argument appearing in Lazes 893-896. ^{22) Jowett, Dialogues of Plato, vol. 2, pp. 634-638.} But in Phaedrus the soul is set forth as a mystical composite, having higher and lower elements, whereas in the Phaedo it appears as one and indivisible.CFF1 585.1

1. CRUCIAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN “PARTS” OF SOUL

As intimated, there are allegedly three parts of the same soul (253). ^{33) Helmbold and Rabinowitz, op. cit., p 38.} The conflict portrayed here is within the soul, rather than between soul and body, as in the Phaedo. And in the Gorgias there is consistent reference to “that part of the soul where the desires are located, the unprincipled part” (493). ^{44) W. C. Helmbold, Plato’s Gorgias, in LLA, No. 20, p. 63.} In Phaedrus, in the good life the passions are obedient to the intellect, which is the charioteer, controlling the life and producing a state of harmony (253) ^{55) Helmbold and Rabinowitz, loc. cit.} Thus there are variations and discrepancies between the different dialogues.CFF1 585.2

2. TRIPARTITE DIVISION OF SOUL BUILT ON “MYTH.”

Here in the Phaedrus, Plato soberly presents the astonishing myth of the three-part form of the immortal soul, covering not only human beings but the gods, as well. We must now follow the amazing reasoning that leads to his conclusions. The poetical figure of a tripart composite of the soul is unabashedly presented, in the likening of the soul to a winged group in the form of a pair of horses (one, white and good; the other, black and evil), with “intellect” as the charioteer—but all three forming a unit (246-248). ^{66) Ibid., pp, 28-31.} Because of the contrariness of one of the horses the driving is difficult, and grave difficulties develop.CFF1 585.3

On the contrary, in the case of the gods, both steeds and driver are “entirely noble.” However, with man they are mixed—the charioteer having difficulty with his steeds (246). ^{77) Ibid., p. 28.} W. C. Helmbold, of the University of California, summarizes in his Introduction the outcome of the clash between the plunging horses. It is the story of descent from the heavens to the earth in this curious way:CFF1 586.1

“The soul loses feathers from its wings; it drops to earth and takes a home, that is, a body which is governed by the composite soul.” ^{88) Ibid., p, x; see also p. 42.}CFF1 586.2

Such is the fantastic tale, with its poetic imagery, invoked to enforce Plato’s argument.CFF1 586.3

3. “FAULT” IN “WINGS” AND “BLACK STEED.”

Dr. Helmbold outlines the cause—a fault in the wings. So the soul, “intended to soar through the heavens,” drops instead to earth. But fault also attaches to the unruly black steed. As a result of the plunging of the black horse, and the consequent crush and confusion, the soul becomes “lame, or breaks its wings,” and is deprived of recapturing on earth the “beatific vision” glimpsed before birth. Thus the soul is tied in inseparably with the concept of reincarnation. Strangely enough, only the soul of the philosopher retains its wings, because he has “communion through memory with those ideas, the communion with which causes a god to be divine.” ^{99) Ibid., p. x.} Happiness depends upon self-control. If this is complete, “their beatitude is assured for eternity.” ^{1010) Ibid., p. xi.}CFF1 586.4

4. SOUL NOT “DERIVED,” HENCE NOT “DESTRUCTIBLE.”

In “Socrates Second Speech,” Plato has Socrates say that “we must discover the truth about the nature of the soul, both the divine and the human.” And he offers as proof the contention that “every soul is immortal, for that which moves itself is immortal”—that is, motion that is not derived from something else, and hence never ceases.CFF1 587.1

He explains that “a first principle” “cannot be derived from anything at all,” for, if “derived from something else, it would lose its nature” in the “process of derivation.” Then he adds, as a consequence, “And since it [the soul] does not come into being, it must also be imperishable .... It is capable neither of destruction nor derivation (245). ^{1111) Ibid., p. 27. Note 9 gives alternate reading, “What is ever in motion is immortal.”} It cannot “come into being” or go out of being. That is the Phaedrus’ contention and the gist of its argument as to immortality.CFF1 587.2

5. “TWO SOULS“: ONE “GOOD,” ONE “EVIL.”

But it is not that simple. As Plato states in Laws (896): “Soul” is “the motion which can move itself.” It is the “first origin and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be.” Thus “the soul is prior to the body”; “the body is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul.” Now, to this, Plato adds, “The soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honorable, just and unjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of all things.”CFF1 587.3

Since “the soul orders and inhabits all things that move,” it therefore “orders also the heavens.” Then comes the startling declaration that there are not less than two souls—“one the author of good, and the other of evil.” ^{1212) Jowett, Dialogues of Plato, vol. 2, p. 638.} Thus we are again led back to stark Dualism, with all its fearsome implications, as noted elsewhere.CFF1 587.4

6. “SELF-MOTION” IS “ESSENCE” OF SOUL

Then, in the Phaedrus, a “definition of the soul” as “self-motion” follows in these explicit words:CFF1 588.1

“Since that which is moved by itself has been shown to be immortal, we shall not be disgraced if we declare that this self-motion is the essence, the very definition of the soul. For every body that is moved from without is soulless; and every body that derives its motion from within itself has a soul, since that is indeed the soul’s nature. But if this is so, that what really moves itself is not the body and is nothing else but the soul, then soul must necessarily be uncreated and immortal” (245, 246). ^{1313) Helmbold and Rabinowitz, op. cit., pp. 27, 28. (Italics supplied.}CFF1 588.2

That is unequivocal—the soul is “uncreated.” And the Phaedrus immediately concludes, “As for the soul’s immortality, enough has been said” (246). ^{1414) Ibid., p. 28.}CFF1 588.3

Reverting to the soul’s form, “expressed more briefly and in human language,” Plato develops the famous winged-horses and charioteer-figure argument, with its poetic drapery—the group having grown into one:CFF1 588.4

“It is like the composite union of powers in a team of winged horses and their charioteer. Now all the gods’ horses and charioteers are good and of good descent, but those of other beings are mixed. In the case of the human soul, first of all, it is a pair of horses that the charioteer dominates; one of them is noble and handsome and of good breeding, while the other is the very opposite, so that our charioteer necessarily has a difficult and troublesome task” (246). ^{1515) Ibid.}CFF1 588.5

There are, therefore, the good souls of the gods and the mixed souls of human beings.CFF1 588.6

7. “IMMORTAL SOUL” PLUS “MORTAL BODY” EQUALS “LIVING BEING.”

Next it is explained that a “living being is called both mortal and immortal”; that is, the soul is immortal, the body mortal. But the soul, which “traverses the entire heaven,” is, oddly, “sometimes in one form, sometimes in another.” When the soul is “perfect and fully winged it soars on high.” But “if it loses its wings,” it descends “until it can fasten on something solid.” It takes on “an earthly body.” So “this composite structure of soul and body joined together is called a living being and is further designated as mortal” (246). ^{1616) Ibid.}CFF1 588.7

8. WING THEIR WAY WITH THE GODS

The “natural function of a wing is to raise what is heavy, and soar with it” to the dwelling place of the gods (246). ^{1717) Ibid., p. 29.} More than all else, the soul partakes of the divine nature. But with man there is strife between the good and the evil. The “horse of evil nature” pulls the chariot “heavily toward the earth”—if the “charioteer” has “not trained him well” (247). ^{1818) Ibid.} But when the immortal souls “come to the summit” they take their position in Heaven, with its entrancing vistas more wonderful than ever poet has envisioned. Such, he declares, is the truth. And such is the life of the gods (248) as they range through the universe, accompanied by the pure souls. ^{1919) Ibid., p 30.}CFF1 589.1

9. VICISSITUDES OF DISEMBODIED SOULS AND WINGS

The myth describes the journey of the disembodied souls, in groups according to their characters, “lifted up by love of beauty—which causes their wings to grow.” The gods, above the rim of Heaven, spend their time in contemplation of the actual “ideal Forms,” and human souls follow on as best they can. Amid the crush and confusion they too occasionally catch a glimpse of the “eternal Forms,” but “lose their wings and drop back to earth.” Back here, through the love of beauty—which reminds them of the absolute beauty they saw above—the wings of the soul begin to grow again (254-256). ^{2020) Ibid., pp 38-42; see also Grube, Plato’s Thought pp. 131, 132.} Thus the tale is repeated in varying form. But Plato urges:CFF1 589.2

“At the beginning of this story of ours we divided every soul into three parts, two of which had the form of horses, the third that of a charioteer. Let us retain this. As we said, one of the horses is good, the other is not” (253). ^{2121) Helmbold and Rabinowitz, op. cit., pp. 37, 38.}CFF1 589.3

10. TIME SCHEDULE of PROGRESSIVE INCARNATIONS

So the human soul “sometimes rises, sometimes sinks.” The horses are unruly. And as other souls also seek the heights, they “jostle and trample on one another.” As before noted, in the desperate struggle many are “lamed, and many have their wings broken through the incompetence of their charioteers.” But according to the “Decree of Destiny” those souls that have caught sight of truth are “free from harm until the next revolution.”CFF1 589.4

The soul, however, that is “unable to keep up,” grows “heavy.” “And in its heaviness molts its wings and falls to earth.” But “such a soul shall not be planted in any beast in its first birth.” Instead, it is “planted” in a human body—as in a poet, monarch, businessman, physician, priest, craftsman, farmer, sophist, et cetera. ^{2222) Ibid., pp. 30, 31.}CFF1 590.1

And souls are born over and over. That principle is involved in the argument of the Phaedrus.CFF1 590.2

“The soul does not return to the place of its origin for 10,000 years”—for it takes that length of time for it to “regain its wings.” And if a soul pursues wisdom for three incarnations “in succession,” it “will become winged in the third period of 1000 years and so depart in the 3000th year” (248, 249). ^{2323) Ibid., pp. 31, 32.} Such are the wild vagaries of the Phaedrus. The basis of the time schedule is not disclosed.CFF1 590.3

11. SECOND INCARNATION AFTER THOUSAND YEARS

But the tale continues. Some, having finished their “first life” are said to go to “receive judgment” in “places of chastisement,” “beneath the earth.” Others are “carried aloft by justice to some part of the heavens.” Then, after this thousand years, both groups “draw lots and choose their second [incarnated] life,” each soul choosing “as it wishes.”CFF1 590.4

A “human soul may enter the life of a beast.” So some animals are degraded human souls. And conversely, a “beast who was once human may become a man again”—for, it is stated, “a soul which has never seen the truth cannot pass into this human form of ours.” Furthermore, the soul remembers what it “once saw as it made its journey with a god,” gazing upon “Reality itself.” Plato then interestingly adds at this point, “It is right for only the philosopher’s mind to have wings,” for “he alone becomes truly perfected. He separates himself from the busy interests of men and approaches the divine” (249). ^{2424) Ibid., p. 32.}CFF1 590.5

Such are some of the astonishing vicissitudes of the “human soul” as here soberly portrayed.CFF1 591.1

12. SOULS BECOME LIKE THE GODS THEY FOLLOW

These periods of transition are times of agitation and despair as the human souls associate with various gods. Some are “not disfigured by this so-called body that we carry about with us, imprisoned in it like oysters in a shell.” Others are beset by human passions, and have pain and distress, as the stump of the wings begins to sprout as support for the soul-like the gums of a child when “cutting teeth.” But it is the “first incarnation upon earth” that is declared to be the crucial time. The souls of those who follow a good god come to “resemble that god.” Those following evil gods become “exactly like their god” (252, 253). ^{2525) Ibid., pp. 34-37. (Italics supplied.}CFF1 591.2

Such were the “poetical figures,” or legends, soberly used to portray the vicissitudes of the “immortal soul” in its varied migrations and transmigrations across the millenniums of time. It must now be apparent that to intelligently and logically accept Plato’s conclusions on the immortality of the soul one must be willing to follow the actual premises from which those conclusions are drawn. And this inevitably necessitates a grasp of those premises, which have here been presented.CFF1 591.3

To reject Plato’s erratic premises while accepting his conclusions is obviously an inconsistent procedure. That is why we have candidly examined the postulates upon which Plato based his deductions, lest the espousal of his conclusions lead us into unwitting embarrassment.CFF1 591.4

The Phaedo —Peak of Plato’s Teaching on the Soul

II. Timaeus—“Human Soul” Diluted Part of “World-Soul”